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Chemerinsky: First Amendment Cases

SUPREME COURT 2000-2001 TERM:
FIRST AMENDMENT CASES
Erwin Chemerinskyl
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court decided eight cases concerning the
First Amendmentthis past term. 2 Before I begin discussing the
most significant of these cases, I wish to identify some general
themes. One is what a large part of the docket the First
Amendment is for the Supreme Court. Of the seventy-eight cases
decided last term by the Court, eight of them dealt with the First
Amendment. The year before that the Supreme Court decided
seventy-three cases, and ten of those dealt with the First
Amendment. My guess is that in no other court in the country does
the First Amendment occupy such a large percentage of the docket.
In terms of all of the areas of constitutional or statutory law, it is
the largest single component of the Supreme Court's docket. The
next largest component of the docket is Fourth Amendmentcases.
While there were eighteen First Amendment Supreme Court cases
over the last two years, there were just nine Fourth Amendment
cases in the same two year period; many fewer.
What is also notable about the large number of First
Amendment cases the Supreme Court hears is how the number has
remained constant over the last decade or two, while the overall
Supreme Court docket has shrunk. Presently the Supreme Court is
deciding only half as many cases as it did a decade ago, and a third
as many as it decided in the years before that. Exactly one decade
ago, in the 1990-1991 term, the Supreme Court decided 157 cases.
The year before that it was 162 cases. In contrast, for the past two
years the Court decided only seventy-eight and seventy-three
cases, respectively.

1Erwin Chemerinsky is a Sydney

M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law,

Legal Ethics, and Political Science at the University of Southern California Law
School. He is also the Director of the Center for Communication Law and
Policy at the University of Southern California.
2The focus of this article is cases decided during the October 2000 Term.
3The two years referred to here are October Terms 1999 and 2000.
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For the entire decade of the 1980s, the Supreme Court
averaged just fewer than 160 decisions a term, whereas for the
entire decade of the 1990s, the Court averaged just over eighty
decisions per term. This reduction, in itself, is significant. It
means that more major legal issues go a longer time before being
resolved, and more conflicts among the circuits and in the states
exist for a longer time before being settled. In light of this
reduction in the docket, the fact that the First Amendment caseload
has stayed so constant is also, in itself, significant. It may be
because the First Amendment holds intellectual interest for the
Justices. It may also be because the First Amendment directly or
indirectly touches so many other issues of law.
The other general comment I wish to make about the cases
in the First Amendment area is in terms of the ideological division
of the Court. There is a real difference between the division of the
Court in the cases concerning the speech clauses and the cases
concerning the religion clauses. With regard to the speech clauses,
the current Court does not follow a consistent ideological pattern.
In so many areas of constitutional law, it is easy to predict what the
Supreme Court is going to decide based on the ideology of the
Justices. For instance, the recent federalism cases have all been
five to four decisions; the five in the majority being Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, and
the four dissenters being Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer. This kind of clear division is not apparent in the freedom
of speech cases. In fact, right now, often the most conservative
Justices on the Court, Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas, are the most
pro-speech Justices on the Court. This began to develop in the
early 1990s and, if anything, has become more evident recently.
On the other hand, in the cases concerning the religion
clauses, the conservatives do have a consistent position. Their view
tends to allow much more government involvement with religion
and religion's involvement in government. Examples include
allowing more aid to parochial schools and allowing for religious
groups' presence in the schools. In this area, it is the more liberal
Justices on the Court who tend to be the dissenters. I will show
you how this theme plays out by focusing on the cases of the last
few years. Finally, I will also alert you to the cases on the docket
for the present term concerning the speech and religion clauses.
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THE SPEECH CLAUSE CASES

Bartnicki v. Vopper
Five speech cases from last term are particularly
significant. I think it is notable how they are each from different
areas of free speech law, and each therefore may affect different
areas of your practice. The first, and the one that I regard as the
most important concerning speech, is Bartnicki v. Vopper.4 This
case involved the tension between free speech and the press, on the
one hand, and privacy on the other. It has interesting facts. Gloria
Bartnicki worked for the Pennsylvania State Education
Association.5 Her job was to help the local teacher's unions
around the state as they were negotiating new contracts. 6 She was
in Wyoming, Pennsylvania, to help the teacher's union there.7 One
day she was in her car talking on her cell phone and she was
speaking to the president of the local teacher's union. He was at
home and he was talking on his land line telephone. It is clear they
thought they were having a private conversation. They were
discussing the negotiation strategy relative to the school board. At
one point in the conversation, the president of the local teacher's
union, Peter Kane, said, if the school board didn't agree to their
demands, "we're gonna to have to go to their, their homes.. .To
blow off their front porches.
...
8 Clearly, this statement was
hyperbole in the context of a private conversation.
Without their knowledge, their conversation was illegally
intercepted and illegally recorded. 9 The reception recording
violated both federal and state wiretapping laws. A copy of the
tape ended uF in the hands of the president of a local taxpayer's
organization. The taxpayer's organization was opposing the pay
4 532

U.S. 514 (2001).
'Id. at 518.
6id.

7

id.

8

Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518-19.

9Id. at 518.

'0 Id. at 520 (violating Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street
Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) and (c) (1994 & Supp. V); 8 PA. CONS.

STAT. § 5703 (2000)).
" Id.at 519.
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raise for the teachers.12 Nothing in the record indicates how he
came to have a copy of the tape; he said it had just appeared. 13 He
then gave the tape to Fred Vopper, who was a radio talk show host
on a local talk show. Vopper played the tape on his radio talk
show. 14 Subsequently, Bartnicki and Kane sued the radio station
and Vopper, the radio talk show host, under a whole series of
federal and state causes of action.' 5 The defendants raised the First
Amendment as their defense. 16 They claimed that the broadcast of
the tape was activity protected by freedom of speech and freedom
of the press. 17
The Supreme Court, in a six to three decision, ruled in
favor of the defendants.' 8 Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the
Court.' 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the dissent, joined by
Justices Scalia and Thomas. 20 Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority, began by emphasizing the narrowness of the Court's
holding. 21 He concluded, in the last paragraph, by again talking
about how narrow the Court's ruling was.
Justice Stevens said
that what the press, the radio station and Vopper did was protected
by the First Amendment for two reasons. First, the radio station
and its personnel did not participateS23
in the illegal interception or
illegal recording of the conversation.
Second, Justice Stevens
said, the tape involved a matter of public importance; it concerned
labor management negotiations between a teacher's union and a
school board. 24 The Court seems to have borrowed from the
doctrine of free speech rights of public employees when it is
speaking about matters of public concern. Here, the Court is using
the doctrine in a case regarding privacy and the First Amendment.
12 Id.
'3

Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 519.

14

id.

Id. at 519-20; id. at 520 (seeking actual damages, statutory damages,
punitive damages, attorney fees and costs).
16 d. at 520.
"

17 Id.
ISBartnicki,532

U.S. at 535.
'9
d.
at
517.
20
Id. at 541.
21 Id. at 517.
22 Id. at 535.
23 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 535.
24 Id.
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Justice Stevens said that in a context such as this one, where the
media does nothing illegal in intercepting and recording the
conversation, and the contents of the recording are a matter of
public concern, then broadcasting the tape is protected by the First
Amendment.25
Justice Breyer wrote a separate concurring opinion joined
by Justice O'Connor. 26 He said he was writing separately to
express the narrowness of the Court's holding. 27 He said this tape
involved a matter of public importance because there were threats
of violence on the tape; when Kane said they were going to the
president of the school board's house to blow away his front porch,
that was a threat of violence.28 Although it was clearly hyperbole
and a very private conversation, Justice Breyer said the First
Amendment protects under these circumstances.
I emphasize that both the majority and the concurring
opinion stress the narrowness of the Court's decision. However, I
do not think the decision is so narrow, and I think it could have
real effects in practice. Before Bartnicki, the Supreme Court had
considered the balance of freedom of speech and press versus
privacy only in the context of information that had been gained
from government records.3 ° In 1975, in a case called Cox
Broadcasting v. Cohn, the Court dealt with a Georgia law that
31
prohibited disclosing a rape victim's identity without her consent.
A reporter broadcasted a victim's name that he had obtained from
readily available court records. 32 The action was brought against
the reporter and the station. 33 The Supreme Court said that since
the information had been lawfully obtained from government
records 34and it had been truthfully reported, there could be no
liability.
25 Id.
26 Id. (Breyer, J.,
27

concurring).

id.

2

1Bartnicki, 532

U.S. at 536.
Id. at 540.
30 See Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Florida Star v. B.J.F.,
29

491 U.S. 524 (1989).
31 Cox Broadcasting,420 U.S. at 471-72.
32
Id. at 472-73.
33 Id. at 474.
34
Id. at 496.
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In a more recent case from 1989, FloridaStar v. B.J.F., the
Court considered a similar statute whereby Florida also prohibited
disclosing a rape victim's identity without her consent. 35 In
Florida Star, the newspaper reporter obtained the rape victim's
name from police records that were lawfully available to thepress,
and the victim's name was published in the newspaper. 3 6 An
action for invasion of privacy was brought against the sheriffs
department and the newspaper.37 The Supreme Court again ruled
in favor of the press, saying that since the information was lawfully
reported there
gained from government records and truthfully
38
could be no liability for invasion of privacy.
Before Bartnicki, the Supreme Court had never dealt with
privacy claims where the information came from nongovernmental sources. Many lower courts had interpreted Cox
Broadcasting and Florida Star narrowly, based upon the special
circumstance of government records being available and freely
reportable. 39 Now the Supreme Court has extended this holding to
cover non-governmental sources. 40 In addition, no prior case had
ever dealt with illegally obtained information. There was no doubt
in this case that the intercepted recording was illegal.41
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court said that the freedom of speech
and press rights trump the privacy claims.42 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, in dissent, lamented that this holding might chill
speech; people might be much less willing to have open
conversations on cellular telephones knowing that their
conversations could be broadcast.43 This, according to Chief
Justice Rehnquist, will have a negative effect in terms of the goals
of the First Amendment.4 The majority, of course, rejected that
argument.
3'491 U.S. at 524.
36
Id. at 527.
" Id. at 528.
3
1 Id. at 541.
39
See, e.g., Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999), vacated by
532
40 U.S. 1050 (2001).
Bartnicki, 532 U.S at 514.
41 Id. at 521.
42 Id. at 535.
43 Id. at 541 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 542.
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Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez
The second case regarding speech is Legal Services Corp.
v. Velazquez.45 I believe that this case also may have a practical
effect in terms of the litigation that will result from it. As you may
know, Congress has put restrictions on what lawyers who receive
Federal Legal Services funds can do.4 6 . For example, lawyers who
receive money from the Federal Legal Services Corporation
("FLSC"), may not bring class action suits, may not bring
challenges to state laws restricting
abortions, and may not
4
represent undocumented immigrants.
Velazquez concerned a certain restriction that Congress had
placed on lawyers which prohibited lawyers receiving FLSC
money from representing clients who wanted to bring challenges to
the validity of welfare regulations and welfare laws.4 ' Those
receiving FLSC money could represent individual claimants, but
only insofar as the representation was to claim benefits for them
under the existing law.4 9 The federal law said that those who take
FLSC money were not allowed to bring
a challenge to the validity
50
regulations.
or
statutes
of the welfare
The Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, declared this
restriction unconstitutional. 5 ' Justice Kennedy said that Congress,
by means of this law, had imposed a viewpoint restriction on
speech; Congress had said that lawyers who take FLSC money
could not make certain arguments.
Justice Kennedy said, in
essence, that what the government was trying to do was to control
both sides of the litigation. 53 The government, Kennedy reasoned,
4' 531 U.S. 533 (2001).

46 Id. at 536-38.
47 Id. at 537-38.
48

Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 538.

The relevant portion of the Omnibus

Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, § 504, 110 Stat.
1321-53, prohibits funding of any organization "that initiates legal
representation or participants in any other way, in litigation lobbying, or rule
making
49 id. involving an effort to reform a federal or state welfare system...
50 Id. at

538-39.

5' Id. at 549.
52 Id. at 543.
5 Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 543 ("[T]he Government seeks to use an existing
medium of expression and to control it .... ).
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already had its lawyer, the one to defend the regulations, and now
was trying to control what the challenger's lawyer
the government
54
could say.
It is interesting to note how the Court distinguished this
case from the decision a decade earlier of Rust v. Sullivan.1 Rust
was a 1991 case that challenged a federal law that said a Planned
Parenthood that received federal funds could not provide abortion
counseling or abortion referrals to its clients.56 The Supreme
Court, in Rust, upheld the federal law in a five to four decision.57
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, said that when the
government puts up the money, the government could put
conditions on the funds. 58 If the government wants to fund
Planned Parenthood only on the condition that if they take the
and abortion referrals,
money they may not do abortion counseling
59
that.
do
to
permitted
is
the government
In Velazquez, the attorneys for the United States argued that
the restrictions with regard to legal services lawyers are no
different from those upheld in Rust; it is Congress deciding what it
will and what it will not fund.6 ° Justice Kennedy, however,
expressly distinguished Rust, saying that in Rust the government
was the speaker, and when the government is the speaker, it can
control its message. 6 1 According to the Court, in the context of
Velazquez, it is the private lawyer who is the speaker, and if the
legal services lawyer is the speaker, then the government cannot
says. 62 To me that seems a
that other Ispeaker
control
what distinction.
doubt that the doctors or the employees
questionable
Id. at 542.
U.S. 173 (1991).
"
56 500
Id. at 177.
57 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court in which Scalia,
White, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined. Blackmun, Marshall, Stevens, and
O'Connor, JJ., dissented).
14

5
59 Id. at 194.

Id. at 196.

60 Velazquez,
61

531 U.S. at 540-41.

1d. at 541.
62 Id. at 542 ("[lt does not follow... that viewpoint-based restrictions are
proper when the government does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a
message it favors but instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of views
from private speakers." ) (citing Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of

Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995)).
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of Planned Parenthood saw themselves as government employees
or government speakers any more than a lawyer who receives legal
services nioney sees himself or herself as a government employee
or speaker. Yet,
the Court does not overrule Rust, but rather
63
it.
distinguishes
I think these cases reflect an inconsistency in First
Amendment jurisprudence, and a general confusion in the area of
the so-called 'unconstitutional conditions' doctrine. The
'unconstitutional conditions' doctrine says the government cannot
condition a benefit on someone having to give up a constitutional
right. 64 When I teach First Amendment law I show my students
that the unconstitutional condition cases are just 'flat out'
inconsistent; at times the Court finds conditions impermissible, and
in other seemingly indistinguishable cases, the Court finds the
conditions permissible. I would line up Velazquez and Rust as
conflicting cases that I, at least, cannot reconcile. I believe that a
result of Velazquez will be challenges to many of the other
restrictions on legal services lawyers. If this particular restriction
is impermissible, then what about the limit on bringing class action
suits, or challenges to abortion laws, or the ability to represent
undocumented immigrants? My own prediction (it is free, and
worth what it costs), is that the Court is likely to say that
restrictions that are subject-matter based violate the First
Amendment, but restrictions that are content-neutral are
permissible.
Take, for example, the restriction that says that those who
receive FLSC money cannot bring challenges to abortion laws; that
is a content-based, or viewpoint-based, restriction on speech. The
Supreme Court repeatedly has emphasized that content-based
restrictions on speech have to meet strict scrutiny. 65 In contrast,
63

Id. at 543.

64 See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996)
(holding, in the context of government employment, "our modem
'unconstitutional conditions' doctrine holds that the government 'may not deny

a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected..
.freedom of speech' even if he has no entitlement to that benefit.") (quoting
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).

See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 812 (2000)
(explaining that the government's restriction on programming content "can only
stand if it satisfies strict scrutiny.... If a statute regulates speech based on its
65
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the restriction on bringing class action suits is content-neutral, and
content-neutral restrictions on speech need only meet an
intermediate scrutiny test.
I think the Court is more'likely to
uphold content-neutral restrictions.
Shaw v. Murphy
The third speech case is Shaw v. Murphy,67 which is an
important case for those involved in prisoner litigation. Shaw
involved a prisoner at one institution who sent a letter containing
legal advice to a prisoner at another institution. 68 The prison
authorities intercepted the letter and did not deliver it. 69 The writer
of the letter sued, arguing that the actions of the prison officials
violated his First Amendment rights. 70 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the prisoner,
7
holding that this was a violation of the First Amendment. '
The statistics of the Ninth Circuit reversal rate by the
Supreme Court is very high and, if ever that is true, it seems to be
when the Ninth Circuit is ruling in favor of prisoners. Here, the
Court reversed. the Ninth Circuit, and reversed it unanimously.72
Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, said that when courts
evaluate prisoner's free speech claims, they should use only the
very deferential rational-basis test; the government should prevail
as long as its actions are rationally related to a legitimate
penological interest.73 This is the test that the Supreme Court
content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government
interest. If a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government's purpose,
the legislature must use that alternative.") (internal citations omitted).
66 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 186 (1997) (setting forth
the intermediate scrutiny test for content-neutral cable regulations).
67 532 U.S. 223 (2001).
68 Id. at 225-26. Murphy sent Tracy a letter, which included the following: "I
do want to help you with your case against Galle. It wasn't your fault and I
know
he provoked whatever happened! Don't plead guilty ....Id. at 226.
69
Id.at 226.
70 Id.at 226-27.
71 Id. at 227 ("[The court] premised its analysis on the proposition
that
'inmates have a First Amendment right to assist other inmates with their legal
claims."') (citing Shaw v. Murphy, 195 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 1999)).
72 Shaw, 532 U.S. at
224.
73Id. at 225, 228, 229.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol18/iss4/4

10

Chemerinsky: First Amendment Cases

2002

FIRST AMENDMENT CASES

667

announced in Turner v. Safley,74 to be used generally when
evaluating prisoners' constitutional claims. 75 Justice Thomas
76
stressed the need for judicial deference to prison authorities.
The extent of the deference to the government is reflected
in the fact that Justice Thomas never explained what the
government's legitimate interest was in this case. What really was
the permissible purpose in keeping a prisoner from sending a letter
containing legal advice to an inmate in another institution? There
was no claim by the government that the letter was in any way
inflammatory. There was no allegation that the letter was going to
disrupt prison order or discipline. The government did not even
claim that the legal advice was bad. Without even explaining the
government's permissible purpose, the Court nonetheless reversed
the Ninth Circuit and ruled in favor of the defendants.77 I believe
that the government does have to articulate a legitimate purpose. I
do not think this case will be a precedent in saying the government
does not have to have a permissible purpose, but I do think that the
case reflects the tremendous deference by this Court to prison
authorities, and the lack of concern it has for prisoner's free speech
claims.
FederalElection Comm 'n v. ColoradoRepublican
FederalCampaign Committee
The fourth speech case is Federal Election Comm 'n v.
ColoradoRepublican FederalCampaign Committee.78 In order to
understand this case, it must be remembered that for the last
quarter century the Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between
government restrictions of contributions in election campaigns as
opposed to government restrictions of expenditures in election
campaigns. In Buckley v. Valeo, 79 in 1976, the Supreme Court said
that spending money in an election campaign is speech protected
74
75 482

U.S. 78 (1987).

1Id. at

76

89.

Shaw, 532 U.S. at 228-30; id at 230 ("Under Turner and its predecessors,

prison officials are to remain the primary arbiters of the problems that arise in
prison management.").
77 Id. at 231-32.
71 533 U.S. 431 (2001).
79 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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by the First Amendment. 80 The Court in Buckley also said,
however, that the government does have a compelling interest in
restricting the size of campaign contributions. 8' The Court said
that large contributions risk corruption and the appearance of
corruption. 82 However, the Buckley Court said, the government
does not have the same compelling interest in restricting
expenditures. 83 The Court said that expenditures are more clearly
tied to speech; expenditures provide for the speech, 84 and
expenditures do not have
the same risk of corruption and
85
appearance of corruption.
Over and again, in the last twenty-five years, the Court has
reaffirmed this distinction between contribution limits being
permissible and expenditure limits being impermissible. 86 A year
ago, in 2000, in a case called Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Political
Action Committee,87 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
distinction. 88 That case involved a Missouri law that restricted
contributions in state elections. 89 The law limited contributions for
statewide offices, such as Governor and Attorney General, to a
thousand dollar maximum, and limited contributions for more local
candidates, such as for the state assembly, to two hundred and fifty
dollars. 90 The Supreme Court, in a six to three decision, upheld the
Missouri law. 91 Justice Souter wrote the opinion for the Court and

'0 Id. at 51.
" Id. at 29.
82 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26 ("It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary
purpose - to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large
individual financial contributions - in order to find a constitutionally sufficient
justification for the $1,000 contribution limitation.").
83
84 Id. at 45.
Id. at 48.
85 Id. at 45-47.
86
See FEC v. Colorado Republican Party, 533 U.S. 431 (2001); see also Nixon
v. Shrink Mo. Political Action Comm., 528 U.S. 377 (2000); FEC v. Mass.
Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986);
FEC v. National Conservative P.A.C., 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
87
88

528 U.S. 377 (2000).
Id. at 382.

89 Id.
90 Id.
9' Id. at

398.
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expressly relied on and reaffirmed Buckley, 92 saying that because
the law concerned a contribution limit, it was permissible. 93 The
Court said that it is not going to get into the business of deciding
what specific amounts may be justified in a94 given race, therefore
the Court must defer to the political process.
Three Justices in the Nixon case, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas, dissented.95 The dissent argued that the Court should
overrule the Buckley distinction. 96 They said contributions in
election campaigns are no different from expenditures. 97 The
dissent reasoned that Buckley's allowance for limits on
contributions should be over-turned, that both types of limits are
invalid restrictions on speech. 98 Interestingly, in Nixon, Justice
Stevens wrote a concurring opinion in which he said he thought
Buckley was wrongly decided in not allowing expenditure limits in
addition to contribution limits. 99 He said he saw no difference
between contributions and expenditures, but he would go the
opposite way of the dissent and allow expenditure limits. 1°° So it
is clear that in Nixon there were five Justices who wanted to
continue Buckley, 10 1 one that would overrule it and permit
expenditure limits, 102 and10 3 three that would overrule it and not
allow contribution limits.
That brings us to the Colorado Republican case.'0 4 What
was involved was the question of whether coordinated
expenditures by a political party on behalf of the candidate should
be treated the same as contributions.105 The Federal Election
Campaign Act says that there is no difference between coordinated
92

Nixon, 528 U.S. at 382.

93 Id. at 390.
94

Id. at 395-97.
9' Id. at 380.
96
Id. at 406 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 410 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
97 Nixon, 528 U.S. at 406-07; id. at 413.
98 Id.

99 Id. at 398-99 (Stevens, J., concurring).
100Id.
101

Id. at 380-88 (Justice Souter, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens,

O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer).
102 Nixon, 528 U.S. at 399 (Justice Stevens).

103 Id. at 406 (Justice Kennedy); id. at 410 (Justices Thomas and Scalia).
'04

533 U.S. at 431.

" Id. at 437.
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expenditures for a candidate and contributions to that candidate. 106
Indeed, what the Federal Election Commission has always said is,
if coordinated expenditures were permissible it would be easy to
circumvent contribution limits. 10 7 For example, a candidate would
merely have to get a political action committee together, get it to
raise the money, and then coordinate expenditures. The Supreme
Court, in a five to four decision, upheld the regulation of the
Federal Election Commission and held that it is permissible under
the First Amendment to treat coordinated expenditures the same as
contributions.' 0 8 Justice Souter wrote the opinion for the Court,
10 9
joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
The four dissenters were
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices Scalia,
1 10
Kennedy and Thomas.
Justice Souter's majority opinion is unremarkable in that it
is in accordance with the law as it stands. He goes back to Buckley
and reaffirms the distinction between contributions and
expenditures. 1 1
He says that coordinated expenditures are
practically no different from contributions.' 12 What I think is most
notable about the case is that now Chief Justice Rehnquist has
joined with Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas and perhaps
could be a fourth vote in the overruling Buckley, and in prohibiting
the government from setting contribution limits. The dissent says
that Buckley should be overruled,' 13 and both contribution and
expenditure limits should be impermissible. 114 What that means is
that for right now, the law is set and stable, but perhaps with one
vacancy on the Court, if either Justice Stevens or Justice O'Connor
leaves the Court, then there will possibly be a fifth vote to join the

'06 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (2000) (the definition of "contribution"
includes "expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or
concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized
political committees, or their agents .... ).
107 ColoradoRepublican Comm., 533 U.S. at 446.
" Id. at 465.

'09 Id. at

436.

Id.

...
Id. at 440-41.

112 ColoradoRepublican Comm.,

113 Id. at
114 Id. at

518 U.S. at 447.

465 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
467.
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dissenters, and subsequently, a major change in the law concerning
campaign finance.
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly
The fifth and final speech case I wish to discuss from last
term is Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly. 1 5 Many state and local
governments have adopted laws and regulations concerning
tobacco advertising. This case involves a Massachusetts regulation
that says there cannot be outdoor advertisements, such as
billboards, for tobacco products within a thousand feet of a school
or playground within Massachusetts. 116 It also says, as to stores
selling tobacco products, any advertisements at the point of sale
have to be five feet above ground level so as not to be at eye level
with children.' 17
The Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, declared the
regulations impermissible. l1 8 Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion
for the Court, drawing a distinction in terms of legal analysis
between restrictions on cigarette advertising as opposed to
restrictions on smokeless tobacco advertising.1 9 The Court
declared both of these challenged regulations invalid, but, it said,
in terms of legal analysis, a distinction needed to be drawn. 120 The
reason is, there is already a federal statute that regulates cigarette
advertising. The statute requires that advertisements of tobacco
products and cigarettes must have warnings and that packages of
cigarettes must have warning labels.12 1 Congress's purpose in
enacting this law was to prevent the states from enacting
conflicting regulations regarding cigarette advertisements. 122 The
Court reasoned that Congress wished to create national uniformity

n1 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
Id. at 534-36.
117 id.
116

Id. at 565, 566. The portion of the regulation pertaining to cigar sales was
upheld. See id. at 570.
n9 Id. at 553.
"oId. at 531.
12' Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 79 Stat. 282, as amended
11

15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (2000).
2 Lorillard,533 U.S. at 541.
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concerning the law regulating cigarette advertising. 123 In light of
this intent of Congress, federal law preempts a state statute that
attempts to regulate cigarette advertising. 124
There are two interesting things to note about this case.
One, is how the Court is clear that any attempt by state and local
governments to regulate cigarette advertising is pre-empted by
federal law. 125 This invalidates laws in Los Angeles, California,
and in many states around the country that are trying to regulate
cigarette advertising in some way. The dissent argues that what
the state and local governments are trying to do is to regulate the
time, place and manner of the advertisements. 126 According to the
dissent, a restriction on outdoor advertising is really a zoning law,
the kind that state and local governments often adopt. 127 The
majority, however, rejects that characterization, and says it is a
regulation
of cigarette advertising that is pre-empted by federal
128
law.
A second observation is the lack of concern for state's
rights in the Court's preemption decision. The conservative
majority of the current Court is very pro-state's rights when it
comes to narrowing the scope of Congress' power under Section
sovereign
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment,
v
" inn-expanding
n"129
immunity, and in invoking the Tenth Amendment. 1 One would
think that a Court who leans so heavily towards state's rights
would also narrow the federal preemption doctrine. One way to
empower state and local governments is to have a much more
limited preemption doctrine, but that has not been the case with
this Court. In almost every case, of approximately ten heard in the
123
24

Id. at 542-43.
Id. at 542.

Id. at 550.
Id. at 592-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127 Lorillard,533 U.S. at 594.
"2 Id. at 548-49.
129 See, e.g., City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (holding that
125

126

Congress cannot expand or create new constitutional rights while exercising its
remedial § 5 Fourteenth Amendment legislative powers); Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996) (holding that Congress may not abrogate the
state's sovereign immunity unless it is acting pursuant to its § 5 Fourteenth
Amendment remedial power); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997)
(using the Tenth Amendment to invalidate Congress's attempt to commandeer a
state's executive official in order to carry out or execute a federal regulation).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol18/iss4/4

16

Chemerinsky: First Amendment Cases

2002

FIRST AMENDMENT CASES

673

past two years where preemption has been raised, the Supreme
Court has ruled against the state or local government, and has
found federal preemption.' 30 This is one of those cases.
As to cigars and smokeless tobacco, there is no federal
preemption because the federal law deals only with cigarette
advertising. 131 Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, said the
Court must analyze these statutes as restrictions on commercial
speech under the First Amendment.' 32 Justice O'Connor reiterated
the test used in commercial speech cases: a government regulation
of commercial speech must be narrowly tailored and substantially
related to an important governmental purpose.1 33 If you are
involved in commercial speech litigation on either side, it is now
clear that this is the test: intermediate scrutiny. Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion immediately concedes that the government has an
important purpose here: discouraging consumption of tobacco
products by children. 134 Therefore, the Court invalidated the laws
on the ground that they were1 35not narrowly tailored and
substantially related to that interest.
As to the restrictions involving outdoor advertising and
billboards, Justice O'Connor pointed out that the record showed
that over ninety percent of all of the land in cities like Boston or
Springfield was within a thousand feet of a school or a
playground. 136 Justice O'Connor said that to prohibit tobacco

See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 94 (2000) (holding that
federal law preempted state regulation of oil tankers); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) (holding that under conflict
preemption, the state foreign trade law undermined the intended purpose of, and
130

was preempted by, the federal Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and

Related Programs Appropriations Act); El Al Israel Airlines v. Tsui Yuan
Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 176 (1999) (holding that respondent's state law claim was
banned by the Warsaw Convention because it did not qualify as an "accident"
under the treaty).
"'1
Lorillard,533 U.S. at 553.

id.
Id. at 554 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
'34
Id. at 555.
135 Id. at 561-65.
36
132
33

1 Lorillard,533 U.S. at 562.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2002

17

Touro Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 4 [2002], Art. 4

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 18

advertising in such a large part of a city
was not narrowly tailored
137
objective.
government's
the
to achieve
As to the restriction on point of sale advertisements that
must be five feet or more above ground level, the Court said that
that restriction also was not substantially related to the goal of
protecting children. 138 Justice O'Connor said that there was
nothing in the record that showed that children cannot see five feet
above ground level, even if it is not exactly at eye level, so there is
no indication that this restriction significantly furthers the
government's goal of discouraging children to consume tobacco
products.139 It is a very broad decision limiting the ability of state
and local governments to regulate tobacco products.

III. PENDING SPEECH CASES
I want to say a few words about the cases that are on the
docket for this term concerning speech. Interestingly, what I think
are the three most important speech cases are all sexual speech
cases; they all involve the ability of the government to regulate
sexually oriented expression. In this area, the Rehnquist Court has
been more difficult to predict. In some cases, the Supreme Court
has deferred to local governments and state governments in the
regulation of sexual speech. An example from the year 2000 is
City of Erie v. Pap's A.M, 4 ° which was a case concerning nude
dancing. Erie, Pennsylvania, was concerned about a nude-dancing
establishment, so it adopted an ordinance prohibiting public nudity.
It was clear that the goal of that ordinance was to shut down the
'Kandy Land' dance establishment.' 4 1 In fact, 'Kandy Land'
closed down before the case got to the Supreme Court. 42 I
thought, for sure, the Supreme Court was going to dismiss the case
as moot. When it still had briefings and oral arguments I said,
'maybe the Justices want to see the pictures, then they will dismiss
1371id.

131 Id. at 566.
139 id.

140

529 U.S. 277 (2000).

141 Id. at 292.
142 Id.

at 287.
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the case.' However, Justice O'Connor said that since the business
and could reopen the club at any time, the case
still had the license
14 3
moot.
was not
The Court in City of Erie, in a six to three decision, ruled in
favor of the government and upheld the ordinance. 144 Justice
O'Connor wrote for the plurality of four. She said that the
government has an important interest in stopping the secondary
She said that nude
effects of a nude-dancing establishment. 45
dancing is alleged to bring crime into the area and that that is a
sufficient non-speech justification to uphold the law.' 46 As the
dissent points out, however, there was nothing in the record
whatsoever to support the idea that this nude-dancing
establishment increased crime.' 47 Justice O'Connor responded to
that by saying that there does not have to be proof of that in the
record, that city council members can take into account their own
personal experiences, (I think she meant in observing the crime,
not in visiting the dance club), and on that basis, can close it
down.' 48 I think the City of Erie case is significant in giving the
government much more latitude to regulate sexual speech. Justice
Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, joined by
Justice Thomas, saying that the law prohibiting public nudity is a
neutral law of general applicability, so the speech clause cannot be
used to challenge it. 149
At other times, however, the Court has been much more
protective of sexual speech. An example, also from the year 2000,
is a case called United States v. Playboy Enterprises.50 This case
involved a challenge to part of the Cable Act that said that cable
51
companies had to prevent 'signal bleed' of sexual images.'
Signal bleed occurs when people can see images on cable channels

143

Id. ("A case is moot when the issues presented are no longer 'live' or the

parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.").

Id. at 283.
t4 City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 296.
'4

46 id.
47

Id. at 321 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'41 Id. at 297-98.
49
Id. at 307-08 (Scalia, J., concurring).
1
ISO 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
"' Id. at 806 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 561 (1994 & Supp. Ill).
1
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they do not subscribe to.' 52 The law said that the cable companies
either had to completely prevent the signal bleed of sexual images
53
or they had to restrict adult programming to the late night hours.
The Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, declared this part of
the Act unconstitutional. 54 Justice Kennedy writing for the Court
155
said that the provision was a content-based restriction on speech;
the law prohibits signal bleed of sexual images but not any other
kind of images.' 56 Justice Kennedy said that content-based
restrictions have to meet the strict scrutiny test, 157 and this law
does not.' 58 This was the first time the Supreme Court had ever
used strict scrutiny in evaluating a government regulation of nonobscene sexual speech. As you can see, the cases on sexual speech
are pointing in conflicting directions.
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition
The first of the three sexual speech cases before the Court
this term is Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,'59 which was argued
to the Supreme Court in October 2001, and involves the Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996.160 The Child Pornography
Prevention Act prohibits child pornography not only when actual
children are used in the production, but also if those who appear 16to1
be children or computer-generated images of children are used.

152id.
153
Id.
54 Playboy, 529
5Ild.at

U.S. at 807.

811.

156
Id.
151
Id.at

813.
Id. at 827.
i59535 U.S. 234, 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002).
158

After Prof. Chemerinsky's

presentation, on April 16, 2002, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "the
prohibitions of § § 2256(8)(B) and 2256(8)(D) are overbroad and
unconstitutional." 535 U.S. at __ , 122 S.Ct. at 1406. The Court concluded

that the government's intent in prohibiting child pornography is in protecting
children. If there are no actual children involved, then the government does not

have a sufficient interest to justify a ban. Id.
'60 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2260 (2000).
161 Id. § 2256(8) defines child pornography as "any visual depiction, including

any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image
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Twenty years ago, in New York v. Ferber,162 the Supreme Court
said that the government can prohibit child pornography because
of the compelling governmental interest of protecting children
being used in the production of child pornography. 163 Here, the
law prohibits child pornography even if no children are used in the
production, even if the image is of an adult who is childlike in
appearance, or if it is a computer-generated image of a child.'64
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declared
the law unconstitutional as violating the First Amendment, saying
the government does not have a sufficient interest in prohibiting
65
child pornography that does not use children in its production. 1
The government claims a moral justification.
The
government also says it would be impossible for law enforcement
to enforce child pornography laws because it Would never be able
to distinguish between computer-generated images and images of
real children. You might have read, as I did, the accounts in the
newspaper of the oral argument, and how the Court seemed very
divided about this case. 66 Some members expressed concerns
whether there is a sufficient government interest here
if no child is
1 68
used. 167 Others seem very sympathetic to the law.

or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means,

of sexually explicit conduct."
162 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
1631Id.at 758.
'64 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8).
165 Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 1999),
aff'd, 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
166See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices Weigh Law Barring Virtual Child
Pornography,N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 30, 2001, at A13.
167 See id.
168 See id.
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Ashcroft v. ACLU
The second speech case pending this term is Ashcroft v.
ACL U.
This case involves a federal law, the Child On Line
Protection Act, 170 which is the successor to the Communication
Decency Act of 1996.171 You may remember that the
Communication Decency Act made it a federal crime to knowingly
transmit indecent material over the Internet in a manner accessible
to a minor. 172 In 1997, in Reno v. ACLU, 173 the Supreme Court, in
a seven to two decision, declared the Communication Decency Act
unconstitutional. 174 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court,
emphasized that the government could not restrict speech meant
for adults to only that speech which would be acceptable for
children.175 Justice Stevens spoke
of the importance of the Internet
1 76
as a medium for communication.
Congress now has enacted a new law, the Child On Line
Protection Act, the daughter of the Communication Decency Act,
which applies to commercial Web sites, businesses that are
accessible on line and that contain adult content. 177 The law
restricts this content only if the requirements of the Miller test are
169

169 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 122 S. Ct. 1700 (2002), rev'g 217 F.3d
162 (3d Cir. 2000). After Professor Chemerinsky's presentation at the PLI
program, the Court decided this case on May 13, 2002. The Supreme Court

reversed the Third Circuit and held that the phrase "contemporary community
standards does not by itself render the statute substantially overbroad." Id. at

122 S. Ct. at 1703. The court remanded the case for consideration of other
First Amendment issues. Id. at _, 122 S. Ct. at 1713.

__,

170
171

Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat 2681 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000)).
47 U.S.C. § 223 (Supp. II 1996) (repealed 1997).

172 Id. § 223(a).
17'
114

521 U.S. 844 (1997).
Id. at 849.
874-75.

171 Id. at

Id. at 870.
ACLU, 535 U.S. at __, 122 S. Ct. at 1705; 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1), which
prohibits any person from "knowingly and with knowledge of the character of
the material, in interstate or foreign commerce by means of the World Wide
Web, making any communication for commercial purpose that is available to
176

177

any minor and that includes any material that is harmful to minors."
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present; the material must appeal to the prurient interest of a child,
and the material is offensive according to contemporary
community standards.1 78 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit declared this law unconstitutional as violating the
First Amendment despite the fact that the law only applies to
commercial sites and incorporates the language of the Miller
test. 79 The Third Circuit emphasized the vagueness of the law, the
same issue that the Supreme Court emphasized in Reno v. ACLU,
especially the vagueness
of the meaning of 'contemporary
80
standards.'
community
Los Angeles v. Alameda Books
The last sexual speech case pending before the Court this
term is Los Angeles v. Alameda Books' 81 which puts before the
Court the question, how much evidence must a local government
have in order to justify regulating adult entertainment
establishments? 182 Los Angeles adopted an ordinance preventing
two adult entertainment establishments from occupying the same
building.18 3 In this case, the challenger's building had both an
adult arcade and an adult bookstore.'1 4 He argued that there was
535 U.S. at ___ 122 S. Ct. at 1705; 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6); see
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 31-32 (1973) (endorsing a community
standards test and stating "[niothing in the First Amendment requires that a jury
must consider hypothetical and unascertainable 'national standards' when
attempting to determine whether certain materials are obscene as a matter of
fact.").
79
ACLU, 535 U.S. at _, 122 S. Ct. at 1706-07.
8
0ACLU, 217 F.3d at 174-75.
181 535 U.S. 425, 122 S. Ct. 1728 (2002), rev'g 222 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2000).
This case was decided on May 13, 2002, after Professor Chemerinsky's
presentation at the PLI conference. The Supreme Court in a five to four
decision reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case for trial. Generally,
the issue on remand is about what kind of proof does the government need to
have in order to restrict sexual speech.
182 535 U.S. at __, 122 S. Ct. at 1733 (The Court of Appeals had
not reached
the issue of whether the ordinance was content based because it said the city had
not presented enough evidence to demonstrate that the ordinance was necessary
to serve a substantial interest in preventing crime in the area of adult
178 ACLU,

establishments.).
13

535 U.S. at___, 122 S. Ct. at 1732.
__, 122 S. Ct. at 1733.

1 4Id. at
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no evidence before the city council that having two adult
establishments in the same building was more likely to cause
undesirable effects than having one adult establishment in the
building.' 85 As I mentioned earlier, in City of Erie, the Supreme
Court upheld the restriction on nude dancing, saying the
government did not need to produce evidence regarding secondary
effects of an adult establishment. 186 You may remember the case
of Young v. American Mini-Theaters,187 over twenty-five years
ago, where the Court upheld a joint zoning ordinance that limited
88
the number of bookstores and movie theaters within a city block.1
Or you may remember City of Renton v. Playtime Theater,189 from
over fifteen years ago, where the Court upheld an ordinance that
required that all the adult bookstores
and movie theaters must be
90
city.
the
of
comer
located in one
Will the Court continue this trend in Alameda Books? Will
it say that if the local government believes it is desirable to prevent
two adult entertainment establishments from being in the same
building, the law has to be upheld? On the other hand, will the
Court, as it has in so many areas of First Amendment law, say that
there has to be some evidence to justify a restriction on speech? I
believe the case is important in defining local government power
over local entertainment establishments.

IV.

THE RELIGION CASES

Santa Fe School District v. Doe
I now want to discuss the cases concerning the religion
clauses of the First Amendment. Specifically, I want to talk about
three cases from the last two years, and then alert you to what I
regard as one of the most important cases on the docket for this

185 Id.
16

City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 296.

187 427 U.S. 50 (1976).

I'g
Id. at 71.
9475 U.S. 41 (1986).
'90 Id. at 46-48.
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year. The first case is Santa Fe School Districtv. Doe, 19 1 which
involves the question of whether student-delivered prayers at high
school football games violate the First Amendment. The case
comes from a small town in Texas. I have often thought that in
order to fully appreciate the significance of high school football in
some communities, you probably need to come from Oklahoma or
Texas. I do not think any of the Justices come from Oklahoma or
Texas, and that may explain why they struck down studentdelivered prayers at high school football games. This case
concerned a town that had a long-standing practice of having a
student deliver a prayer before the varsity football games. 92 When
a challenge was brought, saying that it was an impermissible
establishment of religion, the school changed its policy. 193 It then
adopted an approach where two elections were held each year;
first, the students voted whether they wanted to have an invocation
before the football games, second, they elected a student chaplain
to deliver the invocation.1 94 The students always voted for an
invocation and always voted for a student chaplain, there was
always a prayer and virtually always, it was an explicitly Christian
prayer. 195
The Supreme Court, in a six to three decision, declared that
student-delivered
prayer
before
football
games
are
96
impermissible.'
Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the Court.
I think what is significant about Justice Stevens' opinion is, he
does not choose any particular theory of the Establishment Clause,
instead he shows how student-delivered prayers at football games
are impermissible under any theory of the Establishment Clause.
The current Court is deeply divided when it comes to the
appropriate theory to be applied under the Establishment Clause.
Therefore, Justice Stevens tried to show how all the Establishment
Clause theories were violated. He said the prayer before the
football game is government-coerced religion because many
students have to be at the football games to get academic credit:
1'9'
9 530
'

U.S. 290 (2000).

id. at 297.
'193 Id. at 298.
'94

Id. at 297.

9 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 297.
'96

Id. at 301.
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band members, cheerleaders and football players.' 97 He said there
is great social pressure to be at the football game, the government
was not being neutral, and he emphasized
that the school was
198
encouraging and facilitating the prayer.
The argument was made to the Court that to prohibit the
prayer was an impermissible, content-based restriction on
speech. 199 In many cases over the last decade the Supreme Court
has re-characterized traditional religion issues as speech cases, and
has said that excluding religious speech violates the First
Amendment. 20 0 Justice Stevens rejected that argument. He said
the government here was not creating a public forum. 20 1 It was not
opening its facilities to any speech, since it was not allowing the
selected student to say whatever he or she wished, the student was
restricted to giving an invocation, which is clearly a religious
message.
According to Justice Stevens, the speech claim does not
202
work.
I think the long-term significance of this case is that
whenever a school participates in encouraging or facilitating prayer
it is violating the First Amendment. What I think this case leaves
open is the question of student-delivered prayers, for instance, at
graduation, situations where the speech is the student's choice.
Imagine that a school has a policy of having a valedictorian speak
at graduation. One year the valedictorian decides to give a prayer.
Is that impermissible? Interestingly, there is a conflict among the
circuits on that issue. That was one of the issues presented in the
certiorari petition in this case, however, the Court did not grant
certiorari on that issue. They denied certiorari on the issue where
there was a split among the circuits, whether or not student
delivered prayers at graduation are permissible, but they granted
certiorari on the issue where there was no split among the circuits,
whether or not prayers at high school football games are
permissible.
97

Id. at 311.

198 Id.

'99Id. at 315.

See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508
U.S. 384, 397 (1993) ("Overt viewpoint-based discrimination contradicts the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.") (Kennedy, J., concurring).
20 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 303.
200

202

Id. at 304.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the dissent joined by Justices
Scalia and Thomas, and it is a notable dissent. Chief Justice
Rehnquist said that to exclude prayer is undue hostility to
religion. 20 3 This, I believe, is the approach the conservatives take
in most prayer cases. They say the very exclusion of religion
violates the First Amendment and that religious speech has to be
put on the same footing as secular speech. However, only three
Justices took that position in this case.
Mitchell v. Helms
The second case concerning the Establishment Clause, and
I believe by far the most important is Mitchell v. Helms, decided
June 28, 2000.204 Mitchell concerns whether or not government
aid to parochial schools is permissible. 20 5 In a couple of cases in
the 1970s and 1980s, Meek v. Pittinger °6 and Wolman v.
Walters,20 7 the Supreme Court said that the government could not
give instructional equipment such as audio-visual equipment or
computers to parochial schools because instructional equipment
might be used for religious education. 2 8 The Court in Wolman
also said that any governmental monitoring of the use of the
equipment could cause 'excessive entanglement' with religion.20 9
Mitchell involves the State of Louisiana giving instructional
equipment to parochial schools. 210 The Fifth Circuit declared the
aid unconstitutional based on the precedent just mentioned. 21'
The Supreme Court, without a majority opinion, reversed
the Fifth Circuit.212 Six Justices voted to overrule Meek and
Wolman, however, there was no agreement as to the test to use.
The Court's decision was actually split four to two to three.
2 3 Id. at

318.

204 530 U.S. 793

205 Id. at

(2000).

801.

206 421 U.S. 349 (1975), overruled by Mitchell v. Helns, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
207 433 U.S. 229 (1977), overruledby Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
208 Id. at 250; Meek, 421 U.S. at 363.
209 433 U.S. at 251. In Meek, the Court found it did not have to decide this

issue. Meek, 421 U.S. at 363 n.13.
210 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 801.

2' Id. at 807.
212 Id. at 836.
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Justice Thomas wrote the plurality opinion for four, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices Scalia and Kennedy. 213 Justice
Thomas said that neutrality is the requirement of the Establishment
Clause. 214 He said that as long as the government treats parochial
schools the same as it treats public schools when it gives
assistance, there is no violation of the Establishment Clause.215
Justice Thomas said that there is no violation of the Establishment
Clause if the assistance is used for religious education, as long as
parochial schools are not favored or disfavored, and as long as no
particular religion is favored or disfavored.2 16 Indeed, Justice
Thomas suggested that to deny aid to parochial schools when
secular private schools were getting the aid, would itself be a
violation of the First Amendment.21 7
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion joined by
Justice Breyer. 218 Justice O'Connor said that equality has never
been the sole test of the Establishment Clause.219 She said that for
her the test should be, the government could give aid to parochial
schools as long as the schools did not use the aid for religious
instruction. 220 Justice O'Connor said that here, since there was no
evidence in the record that the schools used the aid for religious
22
education, there was no violation of the Establishment Clause. 1
Justice Souter wrote for the dissent joined by Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg.222 Justice Souter said that the Court should adhere to its
prior test; the government cannot give the parochial schools 223
the
purposes.
education
religious
for
use
might
they
type of aid that
What, then, does Mitchell mean? Four Justices say that any
aid to religious schools is permissible as long as the aid goes to
schools of all religions, and as long as religious schools are treated

Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 801.
Id. at 810.
215 id.
116 Id. at 809-10.
217
Id. at 827.
218 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 836 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
219 Id. at 839.
220 Id. at 860.
221 Id. at 864-66.
213
214

222
223

Id. at 867 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 890-95.
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the same as secular schools.224 These four say it does not matter if
the school uses the aid for religious instruction. 22 5 Two Justices
say that the government cannot give aid to parochial schools if the
schools actually use that aid for religious instruction.226 Three
Justices want to adhere to the prior rule; the aid cannot be the type
of aid that the schools may use for religious instruction.227
What rule of law do you use if you are litigating in this
area? What rule of law do you use if you are a judge who is
deciding a similar case? You must follow the narrowest holding
from the case, that of the five Justices on the Court who agree that
the government cannot give aid to religious schools if the aid is
actually used for religious instruction. Three of those five Justices
would go even further, but five would agree to that composition. I
believe, for now, with the current composition of the Court, that is
the controlling line.
Good News Club v. Milford Central School
The third and final case concerning religion from last term
is Good News Club v. Milford Central School,221 which arose here
in New York. An elementary school opened its facilities to
community groups right after the school day.229 The Good News
Club, an overtly religious group, wanted to come into the school
on the same basis as secular groups did, and wanted to engage in
religious activities; Bible reading, prayer and the like. 231 The
school board refused to allow the Club access to the school, saying
it would violate the Establishment Clause to do so. 231 The Good
News Club sued on free speech grounds.2 32 It argued that to
exclude it from using the facilities was to discriminate against it
Id. at 809. The four justices being Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices
Thomas, Scalia, and Kennedy.
225 Id. at 809-10.
216 Id. at 857. The two justices being Justices O'Connor and Breyer.
224

...Id. at 890-95. The three justices being Justices Souter,
Ginsburg.
22'

Stevens and

533 U.S. 98 (2001).

229Id.

at 102.

210Id. at 103.
231 Id.; id. at 112.
232
Id.

at 104.
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based on the religious content of its expression."' The United
States District Court here in New York ruled against Good News
Club and in favor of the school board. 3 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 235 The Supreme
236
Court, in a six to three decision, reversed the Second Circuit.
Justice Thomas wrote for the Court. Justices Stevens, Souter and
Ginsburg dissented.237
There were two parts to Justice Thomas' majority opinion;
first, he said that to exclude the religious group violated its speech
rights.
Justice Thomas said this case involved a viewpoint
restriction on speech. 239 He said that while secular groups could
come into the school and discuss issues from a secular perspective,
the school board was prohibiting the religious group from coming
into the school and discussing those same issues from a religious
perspective. 240 The Court says this is a violation of the Free
Speech Clause because of the content restriction on speech. 24' It is
one of the many cases I alluded to earlier where the Court has recharacterized the traditional religion question as a speech question.
Second, Justice Thomas says that it does not violate the
Establishment Clause to allow the religious group to have access to
the facilities on the same terms as the secular groups. 242 The
dissent objected to the majority considering this issue at all, since
neither the District Court nor the Second Circuit had ever ruled on
the Establishment Clause question. 243 The lower courts did not
reach the question because they had found no violation of
speech. 244 Nonetheless, Justice Thomas said that as long as
religious groups have the same access to the facility, no more and

233

Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 105.

234

Id. at 104.

231 Id. at 105.

Id. at 102.
Id. at 101.
23 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 109.
236

237

239 id.

240Id. at 112.
241 id.
242 id.
243 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 139 (Souter, J., dissenting).
244 id.
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no less than the secular groups, then the Establishment Clause is
not violated.245
The dissenters here objected and said that this is an
elementary school and these children cannot sort out who is
expressing the message, the government or a private group. 246 The
dissent stressed that the access was to take place right after the
school day.247 Justice Thomas, however, explicitly said that it does
not matter that it is an elementary school, and it does not matter
that the Club will meet right after the school day, it does not
violate 24the
Establishment Clause to give the religious group equal
8
access.

I believe there could still be a basis for challenging a
religious group's use of school facilities after this case, but it
would have to be an 'as applied' challenge. Imagine a situation
where teachers participate in the religious group. Imagine that
announcements are made over the school loudspeaker. Imagine
that there is some argument that the government is coercing or
endorsing religion, facts not present in the Good News Club case.
Under those circumstances, courts can still strike down a religious
group's use of school facilities under the Establishment Clause, but
I think such challenges will be very difficult.

V.

PENDING ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CASE

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris
Finally, I want to mention the case that is on the docket for
this term concerning religion. The case is called Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, and involves the constitutionality of a school
voucher program in Cleveland, Ohio. 249 A federal court order
required the state to intervene in the Cleveland schools due to local
Id. at 114.
Id. at 142-43 (Souter, J., dissenting).
247
Id. at 144.
245

246

241
249

Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 115-17.

122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002), rev'g 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000). In June 2002,
after Professor Chemerinsky's presentation at the PLI program, the Supreme

Court, in a five to four decision, reversed the Sixth Circuit and upheld the Ohio
school voucher program.
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school board mismanagement of the district. 250 In response, the
Ohio legislature created a school voucher program in Cleveland.25'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit declared
the voucher program unconstitutional in December of 2000.252
The Sixth Circuit emphasized that because of the way in which the
Ohio law was structured, parents could use the vouchers for private
secular schools or parochial schools, but they could not use the
vouchers for public schools. 253 The Sixth Circuit said that this
impermissibly encourages parents to send their children to
parochial schools and violates the Establishment Clause.254
It is possible that the Supreme Court in this case will rule
broadly about the voucher issue. Many have speculated that the
Court has been looking for the opportunity to do so. On the other
hand, it is quite possible that the Supreme Court is going to rule
very narrowly about this particular voucher program and whether it
impermissibly encourages parents to send their children to
parochial schools. I think it is safe to say, without question, there
are four Justices who will vote to uphold the voucher program;
Justices Thomas, Rehnquist, Scalia and Kennedy, the four who
were the plurality in Mitchell. They believe that any aid to
parochial schools is permissible as long as the aid is neutrally
available. I think it is also safe to say that there are three Justices,
Justice Stevens, Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg, who will vote
against the voucher plan. These three were the dissenters in
Mitchell.
The key question is, how will Justices O'Connor and
Breyer vote? Will they, as they often have, allow the aid to go to
the parochial schools? Or will they say, because of the unique
nature of this particular voucher program, which seems to
encourage parents to send their children to parochial schools rather
than to public schools, that the program is impermissible and leave
the question of other school voucher plans to be decided another
day? My guess is that this case will be one of the last cases
decided by the Supreme Court, at the end of June. Ultimately, this
0 Id. at 2463.
251
252

Id.
Simmons-Harris,234 F.3d at 948.

253

Id. at 959-60.

214 Id. at 959.
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term's cases reflect the likely themes for the foreseeable future; a
Court that is surprisingly protective of speech, but quite willing to
allow government aid to religion.
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